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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-1555 
______________ 
 
TONY REAVES, 
  
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-09-cv-02549) 
Honorable Christopher C. Conner, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 12, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  VANASKIE, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  January 8, 2015) 
______________ 
 
OPINION *  
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
____________________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
  does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Plaintiff, Tony Reaves, claims that his former employer, the Pennsylvania State 
Police (“PSP”), dismissed him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in retaliation for Reaves having made complaints 
of racial discrimination.  PSP made a motion for summary judgment, which the District 
Court granted as it concluded that Reaves could not establish that there was a causal 
connection between his complaints and his subsequent dismissal.  Reaves has appealed, 
but we agree with the Court’s conclusion and therefore will affirm its order for summary 
judgment entered on February 6, 2014. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Reaves, who is African American, graduated from the Pennsylvania State Police 
Academy in April 2006, and became a probationary PSP trooper.  The PSP probationary 
trooper program enables supervisors to make a comprehensive in-depth evaluation of a 
new trooper.  The program includes periodic written evaluations of the probationary 
trooper’s on-the-job conduct, as well as a general investigation (GI) report compiled near 
the end of the probationary period.  The GI report is a review of the trooper’s 
performance and includes a recommendation of whether PSP should retain the trooper. 
 When Reaves graduated from the academy, PSP assigned him to Troop J 
Lancaster, Avondale Station, where his immediate supervisor was Corporal Erin Magee, 
his station commander was Lieutenant Sheldon Sneed, and his troop commander was 
Captain John Laufer.  Magee’s notes from that period state that in May 2006, Reaves was 
stopped by a trooper from a different station for speeding and that in August 2006, he 
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was stopped by a trooper from yet another station for a minor traffic violation.  During 
that period, Magee counseled Reaves that he had acted unprofessionally in relation to an 
incident involving radio etiquette and that he needed to improve his reputation among 
coworkers and the public. 
 In September 2006, Magee prepared Reaves’s first probationary evaluation, which 
rated him as “satisfactory” in nine categories and “borderline – needs improvement” in 
six.  Magee noted that Reaves, at times, had “displayed a certain arrogance or lack of 
respect towards co-workers” and had “not always used good tact whil[e] interacting with 
his co-workers and supervisors.”  App. 1236, 1245. 
 Magee prepared Reaves’s second evaluation in November 2006, rating him as 
“satisfactory” in twelve categories and “borderline – needs improvement” in three.  
Magee noted improvement in Reaves’s sensitivity and tact towards others but stated that 
he still needed to improve in this area. 
 Later that month, Corporal Steven Ranck replaced Magee as Reaves’s immediate 
supervisor.  Ranck prepared Reaves’s third evaluation in January 2007, rating him as 
“satisfactory” in fourteen categories and “borderline – needs improvement” only in the 
category of job knowledge.  Ranck opined that Reaves had made the necessary 
improvements with respect to his attitude and deportment towards others. 
 On January 23, 2007, Ranck prepared a GI report in which he recommended that 
PSP retain Reaves.  Most of the persons interviewed for the report, including some who 
identified certain problems with Reaves’s attitude and reports, recommended retaining 
Reaves.  One officer, however, did not recommend retaining Reaves, describing him as 
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“so aggressive that he suffers from tunnel vision and makes poor decisions while on the 
road,” and stating that Reaves “has also displayed poor acceptance of criticism and a lack 
of respect for supervisors.”  App. 1383. 
 Sneed likewise recommended retaining Reaves, but, after reviewing the GI report 
and Sneed’s supplemental report, Laufer recommended that PSP extend his probationary 
period for six months.  On March 14, 2007, the Probationary Trooper Review Panel 
(“PTRP”) considered Laufer’s recommendation and similarly concluded that Reaves’s 
probation should be extended.  The PTRP emphasized the problems identified regarding 
Reaves’s attitude and reports, as well as the fact that Reaves had been stopped for traffic 
violations on two separate occasions.1  On March 26, the Probationary Trooper 
Administrative Review Panel (“PTARP”) agreed that PSP should extend Reaves’s 
probationary period.2  PSP notified Reaves of its decision, and Reaves’s then acting 
station commander informed him that his attitude and demeanor toward others would be 
“monitored closely” during the ensuing six-month extension period.  App. 622, 1224-25. 
 Reaves believed he was being discriminated against due to his race when PSP 
extended his probationary term.  Accordingly, on April 12, 2007, he contacted Lieutenant 
Martin Henry of PSP’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office, and complained of his 
treatment.  He contacted Henry ten more times through August of that year.  In looking 
into Reaves’s complaints, Henry spoke with both Sneed and Laufer. 
                                              
1 All of the traffic stops that we describe in this opinion took place while Reaves was off 
duty, driving a private vehicle. 
 
2 The PTRP and PTARP consist of senior officers. 
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 Meanwhile, Ranck prepared Reaves’s fourth probationary evaluation on March 7, 
2007, rating him as satisfactory in all categories, including attitude.  Ranck prepared 
Reaves’s fifth evaluation that May, again rating him as satisfactory in all categories. 
 On July 21, 2007, PSP troopers stopped Reaves again, this time for speeding and 
passing a state police car on the right.  Given Reaves’s history of traffic stops, and after 
consultation with Laufer, Sneed initiated a formal investigation into this incident.  Sneed 
also directed Ranck to look into the details of Reaves’s previous traffic stops and to run 
an offline registration search of Reaves’s vehicle to determine if he had been involved in 
any other traffic stops. 
 The investigation led Reaves to complain to Ranck in August 2007 that he 
believed he was being treated differently than other troopers.  Thereafter, Reaves also 
made both verbal and written complaints of discrimination to Sneed, who forwarded 
Reaves’s complaint to Laufer. 
 While investigating the July 2007 traffic stop, Ranck learned of an incident from 
November 2006 in which Reaves allegedly acted “nasty, demanding and very arrogant” 
toward a sergeant.  App. 104.  Additionally, the offline registration search of Reaves’s 
vehicle revealed that the license plate on Reaves’s truck, which was registered to his 
grandfather, had been run 29 times since Reaves started at the police academy. 
 As required due to the extension of Reaves’s probation, Ranck began preparing a 
second GI report.  The report included information about the July 2007 traffic stop and 
the November 2006 incident between Reaves and the sergeant.  A majority of the 
individuals interviewed still recommended retaining Reaves, but some now made 
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contrary recommendations.  Several officers noted a decline in the quality of Reaves’s 
reports.  Magee, now a sergeant, also stated that Reaves’s demeanor remained a problem.  
Ranck concluded that Reaves should not be retained.  He expressed concern that 
Reaves’s off-duty conduct in relation to the repeated traffic stops showed a poor attitude: 
“I believe that if Trooper Reaves is willing to behave poorly off duty while under the 
scrutiny of probation, the problems will only continue and possibly increase once his 
probation has ended.  I feel that Trooper Reaves’ off duty behavior will jeopardize the 
Department’s image.”  App. 1440. 
 On August 17, 2007, Sneed reviewed the GI report and prepared his own report 
recommending that PSP not retain Reaves.  Sneed stated that despite repeated discussions 
with Reaves regarding the need to improve his demeanor, Reaves continued to speak to 
people in an arrogant manner.  Between August 24 and September 13, Ranck prepared 
three supplements to the GI report.  These supplements provided further information 
regarding the two traffic stops during Reaves’s initial probationary period, Ranck’s 
offline registration search and follow-up investigation, and an additional traffic stop on 
March 12, 2007. 
 On September 13, Laufer reviewed Reaves’s GI reports and supplements, and 
issued a recommendation that PSP not retain Reaves.  Laufer stated that despite some 
improvement in areas previously identified as problematic, Reaves’s attitude and his own 
conformance to the law remained concerns.  Laufer emphasized the multiple traffic stops 
and the lack of respect for the PSP and Pennsylvania law that these incidents reflected, 
and concluded that this “pattern of conduct” while on probation indicated serious 
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behavioral and attitudinal issues.  App. 1420.  The area commander for Reaves’s troop, 
the PTRP, and the PTARP each agreed with the recommendation to dismiss Reaves.  The 
PSP commissioner signed off on this decision on October 2, and Sneed notified Reaves 
of his dismissal two days later. 
 For record-keeping purposes, Ranck prepared Reaves’s sixth probationary 
evaluation, which Ranck signed on October 3.  Ranck rated Reaves’s attitude as 
“unsatisfactory.”  In discussing Reaves’s attitude, Ranck wrote: “Trooper Reaves has also 
recently displayed a negative attitude towards the Department.  He has advised me that 
h[e] feels that there is a double standard used regarding him and that he gets [Bureau of 
Professional Responsibility complaints] for his actions and others get nothing for the 
same thing or worse.  However when asked to supply specific instances so that I could 
look into such things he has been unable/unwilling to provide specifics.”  App. 1324.  
Given that Ranck did not sign this evaluation until after the commissioner consented to 
Reaves’s dismissal, the evaluation did not play a role in the decision to dismiss Reaves. 
 Reaves sued PSP in the District Court, asserting claims of race discrimination and 
retaliation, both in violation of Title VII.  PSP moved for summary judgment on both 
causes of action.  Initially, the Court, adopting in part and rejecting in part a report and 
recommendation from a magistrate judge, granted the motion with respect to the 
discrimination claim but denied it with respect to the retaliation claim.  See Reaves v. Pa. 
State Police, No. 1:09-CV-2549, 2012 WL 4970225, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2012).  In 
that opinion, however, the Court did not address whether Reaves could show that there 
was a causal connection between his complaints of differential treatment and his 
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subsequent dismissal to support a claim of retaliation.  PSP moved for reconsideration 
based on the causation issue, and the Court granted the motion for reconsideration and 
granted summary judgment for PSP.  See Reaves v. Pa. State Police, No. 1:09-CV-2549, 
2014 WL 486741, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2014).  Reaves then filed this appeal limited to 
his retaliation claim. 
 
III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Reaves’s Title VII claims pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we exercise plenary 
review and apply the same standard as the district court.  See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. 
& Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 2014).  To warrant summary judgment, the 
movant must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In applying 
this standard, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.”  Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 
216 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support 
of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the 
jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for complaining 
about certain unlawful employment practices, including discrimination on the basis of 
race.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.  We consider claims of retaliation like the one at issue 
here, where there is not direct evidence of retaliation, using the three-step burden-shifting 
framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 
(1973).  See McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 178 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Moore v. 
City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under this framework, the plaintiff first 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of retaliation; the 
burden of production of evidence then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory reason for taking the adverse action against the plaintiff; finally, the 
burden rebounds to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
proffered reason constitutes a pretext for retaliation.  See Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 
497 F.3d 286, 300-01 (3d Cir. 2007); Moore, 461 F.3d at 342.  But the plaintiff always 
has the ultimate burden of persuasion.  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). 
 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he 
engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse action 
against the plaintiff either after or contemporaneously with the protected activity; and (3) 
a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.  See 
Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2007).  The District Court held, and the 
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parties do not dispute, that Reaves satisfied the first two elements of his prima facie case 
based on his complaints of differential treatment to Henry, Ranck, and Sneed, and his 
subsequent dismissal from PSP.  The District Court concluded, however, that Reaves 
could not establish that there was a causal connection between his complaints and his 
dismissal.  We agree with this conclusion. 
 Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the plaintiff’s participation in a 
protected activity constituted a but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action.  See Univ. 
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); LeBoon v. Lancaster 
Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodson v. Scott Paper 
Co., 109 F.3d 913, 935 (3d Cir. 1997).  We consider “a broad array of evidence” in 
determining whether the plaintiff can show the requisite causal link.  LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 
232 (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 284 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Such 
evidence may include a temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 
adverse action, antagonistic behavior on the part of the employer, inconsistencies in the 
employer’s articulated reasons for taking the adverse action, or any other evidence that 
supports an inference of retaliatory animus.  See id. at 232-33; Abramson v. William 
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2001); Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280-81. 
 However, “[a]n employee cannot easily establish a causal connection between his 
protected activity and the alleged retaliation when he has received significant negative 
evaluations before engaging in the protected activity.”  Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 
194 (3d Cir. 2014).  In Ross, we held that an employee could not establish a causal link 
between his protected activity and his ultimate termination, where the reasons that the 
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employer contemporaneously gave for the termination were deficiencies that it had 
identified in performance evaluations even prior to the employee’s protected activity.  
See id.; see also LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 233-34 (affirming summary judgment because 
employee could not show prima facie causation based on tense relationship with her 
supervisor where this tense relationship predated employee’s protected activity); Shaner 
v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that negative performance 
evaluation after employee’s protected activity did not support causal link so as to survive 
a summary judgment motion where earlier evaluations contained similar criticisms). 
 Here, the reasons PSP gave for dismissing Reaves matched its reasons for 
extending his probation prior to his complaints of discrimination.  In both instances, PSP 
emphasized problems with Reaves’s attitude, reports, and off-duty conduct, including his 
traffic stops.  Reaves points to certain of his supervisors’ evaluations as evidence that he 
had resolved his attitudinal issues before his dismissal, but most of the evidence he cites 
predated his probation extension and therefore does not support an inference that Reaves 
had remedied the problems that led to the extension of his probation.  Similarly, although 
Ranck rated Reaves as having a “satisfactory” attitude in his first two probation 
evaluations after Laufer first recommended the probation extension, these evaluations do 
not establish that there was improvement on Reaves’s part as Ranck gave him the same 
rating in his last evaluation before Laufer’s recommendation.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 
F.3d 759, 767 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 
F.2d 509, 533 (3d Cir. 1992)) (noting that relevant decisionmakers often disagree about 
an employee’s qualifications and that such disagreement does not evidence 
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discriminatory intent).  Furthermore, these evaluations preceded Reaves’s July 2007 
traffic stop, after which Ranck learned of the more extensive problems with Reaves’s 
attitude and off-duty conduct. 
 Reaves contends that the increased scrutiny and investigation that uncovered these 
more extensive problems resulted from retaliatory animus, but he does not present 
adequate evidence to support this claim.  As Reaves acknowledges, PSP informed him at 
the time it extended his probation that he would be “monitored closely” during the 
ensuing period.  Appellant’s br. 15.  PSP initiated its investigation into Reaves’s off-duty 
conduct only after learning of his involvement in a third off-duty traffic stop during his 
probationary period.  Reaves provides no evidence that such an investigation was unusual 
for a trooper who continued to have problems with off-duty conduct after PSP extended 
his probation in part because of such conduct.  The only evidence of retaliatory animus 
that Reaves identifies is that in his last probationary evaluation, Ranck cited Reaves’s 
complaints of differential treatment as one of the examples of his unsatisfactory attitude.  
However, this isolated comment, signed after PSP already had finalized its decision to 
dismiss Reaves, does not by itself constitute sufficient evidence of a retaliatory motive 
for Reaves to survive the motion for summary judgment.  See Estate of Oliva ex rel. 
McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 799 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment 
for employer and declaring that commander’s comment, after twice transferring plaintiff, 
that he was “pissed” at plaintiff for making certain statements did not provide adequate 
“foundation on which a reasonable factfinder could predicate a finding that the transfers 
were in retaliation for” plaintiff’s earlier complaints); Woodson, 109 F.3d at 921-22 
13 
 
(noting that suggestion by employer’s director of human resources that plaintiff drop his 
equal employment opportunity suits would not alone suffice to establish prima facie 
causal link); Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 (“Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by 
decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight . . . .”). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of PSP entered on February 6, 2014. 
